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1. Introduction 
 
The decision of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) in Teitiota 
v New Zealand has been widely hailed as heralding a major development 
in the jurisprudence on ‘climate refugees’.1 Even more nuanced commen-
tators have asserted that it represents a significant, if imperfect, step for-
ward in patching together a regime of protection for the increasing num-
bers of people who are being displaced by the effects of climate change. 
No less a figure than Filippo Grandi, the current head of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) described the HRC decision as 
meaning: ‘if you have an immediate threat to your life due to climate 
change, due to the climate emergency, and if you cross the border and go 
to another country, you should not be sent back because you would be 
at risk of your life, just like in a war or in a situation of persecution’.2 
Would that this was so, but in our view, not yet. Moreover, there is an 
obvious problem with these optimistic views of the HRC decision: in 
spite of quite substantial evidence of serious harm in which climate 
change is a major factor, the claim for protection failed. 
In this article, we therefore question these evaluations and ask 
whether the HRC decision is a welcome incremental step forward, or 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Warwick. 
** Associate Professor of Law, University of East Anglia.  
1 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Ioane Teitiota v New Zealand (advance un-
edited version now available: 23 September 2020) UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 
(7 January 2020). 
2 L Baker, ‘World needs to prepare for “millions” of climate refugees – UN’, 
Financial Post (21 January 2020) available at <https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-
pmn/world-needs-to-prepare-for-millions-of-climate-refugees-un>.  
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whether it adds little to the already meagre human rights jurisprudence 
in regards to climate refugees.    
We will give a brief precis of the background to this case, and of the 
issues that were raised at various points throughout the litigation. We will 
then highlight the key sticking points that prevented the claim for pro-
tection being successful. Finally, we will offer some critical analysis of the 
HRC decision, and suggest why the human rights paradigm, certainly as 
it is currently conceived, may present some insuperable barriers for cli-
mate refugees to seek protection within it.  
 
 
2. Background 
 
The facts of the case illustrate some of the ambiguities of identifying 
cause, nomenclature and protection needs, when it comes to the nexus 
of climate change, forced migration, and human rights.3 For several years 
in the 2000s the claimant Ioane Teitiota and his wife struggled with living 
on poor-quality land, frequently inundated by high tides and flooding. 
So, in 2007 they decided to leave their home in Tarawa, one of the islands 
in the low-lying Pacific island state of Kiribati, for New Zealand. They 
managed to get jobs and work visas in New Zealand, and scrabbled to-
gether just enough money for their flights there. For several years, they 
toiled away at their jobs, had three children and settled into their new 
life. So far, so typical of what is commonly referred to as ‘economic mi-
gration’. The problem arose when their visas ran out, and they inadvert-
ently failed to renew them in time. Teitiota and his family had reached a 
dead end as far as their legal status in New Zealand was concerned, and 
their deportation back to Kiribati was the logical outcome.  
However, they engaged an enterprising activist/lawyer, Michael 
Kidd, who decided to frame an alternative claim as ‘climate refugees’. An 
asylum claim was lodged under Section 198 of the Immigration Act 2009. 
This allows for a right to remain in New Zealand, either as a refugee under 
 
3 A very good detailed background to the case can be found in KR Weiss, ‘The Making 
of a Climate Refugee’ Foreign Policy (28 January 2015) available at 
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/28/the-making-of-a-climate-refugee-kiribati-tarawa-
teitiota/>. 
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the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention,4 to which New Zealand is a 
state party, or alternatively on the basis of complementary protection un-
der various other human rights treaties, namely the 1984 Convention 
Against Torture (CAT),5 and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).6 In no way should this be understood as a vexa-
tious or crudely opportunist legal strategy. The evidence presented by Tei-
tiota was based on his own testimony, plus that of an expert witness who 
has done extensive research on the effects of climate change in the region, 
and also the 2007 National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) pre-
sented by the government of Kiribati to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).7 From the initial Immigration 
and Protection Tribunal hearing all the way up to the HRC, every court 
found the evidence presented to be entirely credible. Inter alia, the evi-
dence detailed coastal erosion, increased storm surges and flooding, con-
tamination of relatively scarce sources of potable water that in turn has 
caused diseases especially amongst young children, loss of land on which 
to live and grow food that has in turn led to violent disputes between neigh-
bours. Specifically, it was accepted that these deteriorating conditions of 
life on the islands has been caused, at least partly, by the effects of climate 
change, both sudden and slow-onset.8 So clearly there was substantial evi-
dence for a threat to life on Kiribati as a result of the effects of climate 
change. Why, then, did the claim repeatedly fail at each legal stage?   
 
 
3. The New Zealand litigation: When a refugee is not a ‘refugee’ 
 
The question as to whether to refer to people like Teitiota as ‘climate 
refugees’ or ‘climate migrants’ or any number of alternative labels has 
been a topic of widespread debate. Indeed, we have written elsewhere 
 
4 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into 
force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137. 
5 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 
UNTS 85. 
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
7 This evidence is presented in its most detailed form in AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 
800413 (25 June 2013) paras 5-33. 
8 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413 (25 June 2013) para 39.  
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laying out a set of arguments in favour of ‘climate refugee’ as an appro-
priate and accurate descriptor.9 We do not propose to rehearse those 
points again in full here. Suffice to say, the Teitiota case, and the HRC 
decision, in our view, reinforce the argument for referring to ‘climate ref-
ugees’. The key point of the decision that has been championed by most 
commentators is that non-refoulement was found to be, in principle, ap-
plicable in cases where the effects of climate change created a real risk of 
harm. Non-refoulement is the child of refugee law.10 It expresses the idea 
that claimants have been forced to flee a source of danger, and is there-
fore not a matter of choice, of mere migration in the common usage of 
that word. 
Confusion was sown in the New Zealand litigation by a discussion on 
the ‘sociological’ versus ‘legal’ conception of a refugee that appears in the 
initial Immigration and Protection Tribunal, and continues on through 
subsequent stages of the case.11 Part of the confusion stems from an at-
tempt by Teitiota’s lawyer to effectively ignore the distinction between 
the two. A convincing argument was made that the term ‘refugee’ has a 
much broader meaning than the legal one. However, it is unarguable, as 
the New Zealand courts pointed out, that in a legal context ‘it is the legal 
conception which applies, not the sociological one’.12 It also detracts 
from a more substantive argument advanced on Teitiota’s behalf around 
the notion of persecution. This term, so central to the legal definition of 
a refugee, is left undefined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and other 
legal instruments of refugee law. Atle Grahl-Madsen, one of the founders 
of the academic discipline of refugee law, wrote many years ago: ‘The 
 
9 A Kent, S Behrman, Facilitating the Resettlement and Rights of Climate Refugees: 
An Argument for Developing Existing Principles and Practices (Routledge 2018) ch 2. 
10 A weak version of this principle first appears in art 3 of the Convention Relating 
to the International Status of Refugees (adopted 28 October 1933) 159 LNTS 200; it is 
then further elaborated in art 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (n 4). Subsequently, it 
was also included in art 3 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture (n 5) and developed 
as a positive obligation in respect of various human rights obligations eg Soering v UK  
App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989). It is now widely considered to be customary 
principle of international law. 
11 First discussed at para 51 of the Immigration and Protection Tribunal judgment. 
The distinction is taken from A Suhkre ‘Environmental Degradation and Population 
Flows’ (1994) 47 J Intl Affairs 482. 
12 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413 (25 June 2013) para 52. 
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term “persecution” has nowhere been defined and this was probably de-
liberate. It seems as if the drafters have wanted to introduce a flexible 
concept which might be applied to circumstances as they might arise’.13  
The New Zealand courts follow what has become known as the Hath-
away concept of persecution: a ‘sustained or systemic violation of basic 
human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection’.14 On the face 
of it, there is no reason why this cannot include the situation of people 
like Teitiota; the effects of climate change are systemic in nature and sus-
tained in their negative effects on individual and collective human rights. 
However, the New Zealand courts add to this, and indeed they do so in 
line with mainstream jurisprudence on the issue, that persecution also 
involves direct human agency.15 Teitiota’s lawyer answered this with a call 
to embrace an expanded concept of persecution that identifies ‘an indi-
rect but worldwide human agency’ to take account of the collective global 
set of actions that have caused climate change.16 But beyond deploying a 
rather crude slippery slope argument,17 this specific argument is never 
addressed head on by any of the tribunals that heard this case. To be sure, 
accepting such a concept would significantly expand the jurisprudence 
on persecution, but it still begs the question as to why, in the context of 
a phenomenon such as climate change, such a development is illegiti-
mate, especially if, as Grahl-Madsen argued, the drafters of the Conven-
tion intended it to have a flexible meaning. Indeed, the whole framework 
of climate change law is built upon the notion of collective agency and 
responsibilities for the effects of global warming.  
So, on the basis of the existing jurisprudence, the claim for refugee 
status under the 1951 Refugee Convention was arguably a legal long shot. 
Sure enough, from the initial tribunal through appeals up to the Supreme 
Court, the judgments were unanimous that in the clear absence of any 
identifiable persecutor the claim failed.  
 
13 A Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, vol 1 (AW Sijthoff 
1966) 193.  
14 J Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths 1991) 101. 
15 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413 (25 June 2013) at para 54. 
16 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment 
[2013] NZHC 3125 (26 November 2013) at para 40. 
17 ibid para 51. 
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Yet, for many, the New Zealand courts laid the basis for possibly ex-
panding the scope of refugee law to encompass ‘climate refugees’ in the 
future. This claim hinges upon the fact that, as the Supreme Court noted:  
 
‘both the Tribunal and the High Court, emphasised their decisions did 
not mean that environmental degradation resulting from climate change 
or other natural disasters could never create a pathway into the Refugee 
Convention or protected person jurisdiction. Our decision in this case 
should not be taken as ruling out that possibility in an appropriate 
case’.18  
 
Yet there remains a fundamental ambiguity: what are the potential 
routes? The High Court gave a fairly clear answer to this question: 
 
‘Environmental issues sometimes lead to armed conflict. There may be 
ensuing violence towards or direct repression of an entire section of the 
population. Humanitarian relief can become politicised, particularly in 
situations where some group inside a disadvantaged country is the target 
of direct discrimination’.19 
 
If the suggested pathways then are simply that the impacts of climate 
change will lay the groundwork for the more classic causes of forced mi-
gration, such as war and persecution, then it is difficult to see how any-
thing new is being added here. After all, arguably, environmental factors 
have long been at the root of armed conflict and other forms of violence, 
such as with the Marsh Arabs in Iraq in the early 1990s and more recently 
in Syria.20 As far back as 1979 the UNHCR stated in its handbook for 
determining refugee status, that while the 1951 Refugee Convention ex-
cludes people who have fled natural disasters without a well-founded fear 
of persecution, such conditions may not ‘be altogether irrelevant to the 
process of determining refugee status, since all the circumstances need to 
 
18 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment 
[2015] NZSC 107 para 13. 
19 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment 
[2013] NZHC 3125 (26 November 2013) para 27. 
20 Human Rights Watch, ‘The Iraqi Government Assault on the Marsh Arabs’ 
(January 2003) 4 available at <www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/ 
marsharabs1.pdf>; CP Crane et al, ‘Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and 
Implications of the Recent Syrian Drought’ (2015) 112 Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 3241. 
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be taken into account for a proper understanding of the applicant’s 
case’.21 So, there is little advance in simply stating that the effects of cli-
mate change may contribute to a potential claim for refugee status.   
There is also an implicit and deeply perverse aspect to the reasoning 
of the New Zealand courts. According to their logic, if communities af-
fected by climate change collectively and co-operatively seek to manage 
their situation and then claim for protection under either the ICPPR or 
the Refugee Convention, then they are likely to fail: no violence, no dis-
crimination, no valid claim. If, on the other hand, they descend into vio-
lence and discrimination, then the doors may be opened to them. In 
short, the extra step, beyond the environmental threat, is that affected 
communities are expected to display the worst aspects of human behav-
iour towards one another in order to benefit from human rights protec-
tion. Of course, human rights have developed precisely out of the need 
to protect people from these types of behaviours, otherwise the need for 
them would not arise in the first place. But this is what makes the effects 
of climate change novel. We are not dealing with harm that has been in-
tended; at worst, it has been recklessly caused. Moreover, the perpetra-
tors are not so easy to identify, at least not on an individual basis. Also, 
the scientific knowledge that we have about the development of climate 
change allows us to pre-empt the dangers before they manifest them-
selves, and before they lead to serious breakdowns in social relations. 
Little more than a week after the Supreme Court turned down Teiti-
ota’s appeal, he was deported back to Kiribati, followed soon after by his 
wife and children. As a last ditch attempt at finding redress, he then 
lodged a claim with the HRC. This body has jurisdiction only over alleged 
violations of the ICCPR, and not on claims for refugee status. The claim 
here, therefore, shifted to a focus on an alleged violation of the right to 
life under Article 6 of the ICCPR by New Zealand on the basis of the 
principle of non-refoulement, ie that they violated the positive obligation 
on states not to send people back to a place where there right to life 
would be threatened.  
 
21 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Handbook and Guidelines on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (February 2019) UN Doc 
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.4. The Handbook is now in its fourth edition, but the wording 
cited here has remained unchanged since the original 1979 publication. 
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4. The Human Rights Committee ruling: How much of an advance in the 
law does it represent? 
 
The evidence before the HRC was essentially the same as that which 
had been presented in the New Zealand courts, with the added element 
that since their return to Kiribati at least one of the Teitiota’s children 
had developed an illness likely caused by contaminated water. Again, the 
HRC found the evidence presented of the dangers faced in Kiribati to be 
wholly reliable. And yet, once again, the claim failed. Despite this, many 
commentators have asserted that it does at least move the agenda forward 
when it comes to establishing legal protections for people fleeing the ef-
fects of climate change. For example, it has been argued that:  
 
‘until recently, the idea that the principle of non-refoulement could ap-
ply to persons who have fled the effects of climate change might still 
seem far-fetched. With this new decision, States must now duly motivate 
their refusal in the light of the actual situation suffered by the applicant 
for international protection, bearing in mind that they may have an ob-
ligation to receive him or her if what has been done to reduce the effects 
of climate change and help those already suffering the full consequences 
of it is not sufficient’.22 
 
Similarly, Amnesty International hailed the HRC decision as setting 
‘a global precedent’:  
 
‘It says a state will be in breach of its human rights obligations if it re-
turns someone to a country where – due to the climate crisis – their life 
is at risk, or in danger of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment trig-
gered’.23 
 
 
22 M Courtoy, ‘United Nations Human Rights Committee, Views on Communication 
No 2728/2016, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, October 24, 2019: An Historic Decision for 
“Climate Refugees”? Putting It into Perspective’ (25 March 2020) available at 
<https://uclouvain.be/en/research-institutes/juri/cedie/news/united-nations-human-rights 
-committee-views-on-communication-no-2728-2016-ioane-teitiota-v-new-zealand-october-
24-2019.html#_ftn18>.  
23 Amnesty International UK, ‘UN landmark climate refugee ruling sets global prec-
edent’ (20 January 2020) available at <www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/un-landmark-
climate-refugee-ruling-sets-global-precedent>. 
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Yet, already in 2018, the HRC in its General Comment No 36 clearly 
stated that environmental degradation can be brought within the scope 
of a violation of the right to life under Article 6 of the ICCPR.24 Indeed, 
in the Teitiota case, the HRC highlighted this point. This reiteration is of 
course important on its own, enforcing the link between climate change 
and human rights even further. The bar, however, is set too high for 
reaching the necessary conditions to engage protection under the ICCPR. 
Or, put another way, a promise of protection is extended to potential 
climate refugees, but only in the most dire of circumstances.  
The fact that the HRC have confirmed that ‘Pacific Island states do 
not need to be under water before triggering human rights obligations to 
protect the right to life’ is also hailed as an important step forward.25 Yet, 
this was never going to be the case. To state an obvious point, assuming 
that nothing is done, most, if not all of the island’s inhabitants would have 
long since moved or be dead before that point is reached. The issue is not 
about what happens when the islands are already submerged or other-
wise uninhabitable, but what is done when life becomes so difficult to 
sustain that it causes suffering and a loss of dignity.26 The HRC had al-
ready stated some years back that the right to life is not restricted to mere 
existence, but encompasses a wider scope, ‘to be free from acts and omis-
sions that are intended or may be expected to cause their unnatural or 
premature death, as well as to enjoy a life with dignity’.27 In short, as Mir-
iam Cullen points out, a finding that it is a human rights violation to send 
someone back to where their life might be threatened is ‘not a legal rev-
olution’ but rather engages the well-established principle of non-re-
foulement.28  
The UNHCR in its response to the HRC decision has said: 
 
24 HRC, ‘General Comment No 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life’ UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36 (30 October 
2018) para 62. 
25 Amnesty International UK (n 23). 
26 For a detailed discussion of the notion of ‘dignity’ in the context of the Teitiota 
case and the right to life, see S Atapattu, ‘Migrating with Dignity: Protecting the Rights 
of “Climate Refugees” with the Non-refoulement Principle’, in S Behrman, A Kent (eds), 
Climate Refugees: Global, Local, and Critical Approaches (CUP forthcoming). 
27 HRC, General Comment No 36 (n 24) para 3. 
28 M Cullen, ‘The Human Rights Committee’s Recent Decision on Climate 
Displacement’ Asylum Insight: Facts and Analysis’ (February 2020) available at 
<www.asyluminsight.com/c-miriam-cullen?rq=cullen#.X4AnX5NKhbV>. 
QIL 75 (2020) 25-39              ZOOM IN 
 
34 
‘UNHCR has consistently stressed that people fleeing adverse effects of 
climate change and the impact of sudden and slow-onset disasters may 
have valid claims for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention 
or regional refugee frameworks. This includes but is not limited to situ-
ations where climate change and disasters are intertwined with conflict 
and violence. The Committee’s decision supports this interpretation of 
existing protection frameworks. It recognises that international refugee 
law is applicable in the context of climate change and disaster displace-
ment’.29  
 
This is a somewhat odd statement, as the HRC was not ruling, and 
indeed had no jurisdiction to rule on refugee status. But, in any case, this 
statement adds practically nothing, as people fleeing most things, so long 
as they intersect with the grounds specified in the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion, have never ipso facto been excluded.30 This could include the effects 
of poverty, natural disasters, or anything else that is combined with per-
secution on grounds of race, nationality, religion, political opinion or 
membership of a social group.  
 
 
5. Problems with the human rights paradigm 
 
To return to the reasons for the failure of the claim before the HRC, 
there were essentially two problems. First, that the danger faced was not 
specific enough to Teitiota and his family; it was basically the same as that 
faced by all other inhabitants of Kiribati.31 The obligation to refrain from 
deportation arises only when the risk is personal to the claimant. Claims 
that are based on general conditions will be accepted only in ‘the most 
extreme cases, and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial 
grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists’.32 
 
29 UNHCR, ‘UN Human Rights Committee decision on climate change is a wake-up 
call, according to UNHCR’ (24 January 2020) available at <www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/ 
2020/1/5e2ab8ae4/un-human-rights-committee-decision-climate-change-wake-up-call-ac-
cording.html>. 
30 See, for example, UNHCR, ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection’ (February 2019) 
para 39. 
31 HRC, General Comment No 36 (n 24) para 30. 
32 HRC, Ioane Teitiota v New Zealand (n 1) para 9.3.    
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Following on from this, in spite of the fact that it was acknowledged 
by all parties that material conditions in Kiribati were bad and deterio-
rating, Teitiota did not show that his conditions would be significantly 
worse than anyone else there.33 Indeed, here there is an overlap with in-
ternational refugee law, in which persecution must be shown to be di-
rected at a specific individual or group, but generalised violence or threat 
to life is insufficient to warrant refugee status. And, yet, this criterion 
presents a real problem for potential claimants in the context of climate 
change, as that is precisely a phenomenon that affects communities in 
general, rather than specific individuals. It is difficult to imagine a case 
where an individual or defined group within a geographic area will expe-
rience the effects of climate change in ways that go beyond general con-
ditions. Indeed, there are likely to be only two types of situation where 
this will arise. First, where there is discrimination against a segment of 
the population, but this simply takes us back to already established refu-
gee and human rights law. Second, there could be circumstances where 
relative poverty might lead to a widely disproportionate impact on the 
poor. This raises some interesting possibilities. However, in the circum-
stances of states such as Kiribati, in which the entire country is in peril, 
this will be of much less relevance. Thus, an insistence on demonstrating 
a greater risk of harm than the general population will create an insuper-
able barrier to many who currently face the sharp end of climate change 
such as low-lying Pacific island nations. As one of the dissenting experts 
on the committee, Duncan Laki Muhumuza put it: ‘New Zealand’s action 
is more like forcing a drowning person back into a sinking vessel, with 
the “justification” that after all, there are other voyagers on board’.34 
The caveat to the personal requirement is where general conditions 
are so extreme that they pose a serious risk to life. But as both dissenting 
opinions in the HRC argue, if the present conditions on Kiribati, includ-
ing depleted sources of safe water and food, repeated flooding and de-
struction of land, homes and the ability to grow crops, and widespread 
disease amongst children due to contaminated water, are not sufficient 
to reach that bar, then what is? The ‘most extreme condition’ however, 
certainly opens a window that future claimants should not ignore. As the 
 
33 ibid paras 9.6, 9.7. 
34 ibid, Annex 2, para 6. 
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dissenting opinions demonstrate, the possibility of a more accommodat-
ing interpretation of this exception exists, and has some support within 
the HRC.  
 
 
6.  How soon is soon?  
 
The second hurdle, and perhaps the lynchpin of the HRC’s refusal to 
find in favour of Teitiota’s claim is that the timescale for the islands of 
Kiribati to become uninhabitable is 10-15 years. For the HRC this is too 
far into the future to establish an imminent threat to life, for this period: 
 
‘could allow for intervening acts by the Republic of Kiribati, with the 
assistance of the international community, to take affirmative measures 
to protect and, where necessary, relocate its population. The Committee 
notes that the State party’s authorities thoroughly examined this issue 
and found that the Republic of Kiribati was taking adaptive measures to 
reduce existing vulnerabilities and build resilience to climate change-
related harms’.35 
 
As Jane McAdam argues: ‘This reasoning requires scrutiny. Mere 
speculation about hypothetical events far into the future is very different 
from situations where there is sound scientific evidence weighing strongly 
in favour of particular outcomes’.36 Indeed, already five years ago a report 
on the Teitiota case in Foreign Policy laid out in greater detail the existing 
degraded conditions in Kiribati: 
 
‘Tarawa residents have been alarmed that 2,400 children fell ill and nine 
children died after picking up a rotavirus, likely from sewage-contami-
nated water. Aside from the widespread practice of outdoor defecation, 
pit latrines and flush toilets often leak into the freshwater lens, accord-
ing to a 2012 presidential report on South Tarawa; all groundwater has 
tested positive for fecal coliform. Other infectious diseases are taking 
 
35 ibid para 9.12. 
36 J McAdam, ‘Protecting People Displaced by the Impacts of Climate Change: The 
UN Human Rights Committee and the Principle of non-refoulement’ (2020) 114 AJIL 
718-719. 
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advantage of the crowding in this island nation’s shantytowns. Tuber-
culosis is on the upswing. Leprosy is spreading’.37 
 
The report goes on to quote the then President of Kiribati, Anote 
Tong, saying that while the government had adaption plans such as build-
ing sea defences, given the extreme vulnerability of what are essentially 
nothing more than sandy atolls, these would be relatively ineffective. As 
such, it was more realistic to plan for buying land elsewhere for future 
sources of agricultural production and evacuation.38 The dissenting opin-
ions of both Vasilka Sancin and Duncan Laki Muhumuza both emphasise 
the present dire conditions in Kiribati as the basis of their criticism of the 
majority of the Committee in refusing the claim.39    
However, even if we are to accept that the general conditions have 
not yet reached the extreme threshold for a successful Article 6 claim, 
there is a perverse element, similar to that identified above in respect of 
refugee claims, to some of the HRC’s reasoning on the time frame; the 
absence of violence of the type that results from direct human agency 
hobbles the claim. In addition, emphasis is put on the fact that the gov-
ernment of Kiribati has made efforts to mitigate the effects of climate 
change, which in turn underpins why a timescale of 10-15 years allows 
for the possibility that Teitiota, and others like him will not experience a 
significant threat to life.40 In essence, this suggests that if the governments 
of threatened states like Kiribati wish to ease their citizens’ path to seek-
ing protection elsewhere – a real possibility given the strains faced by 
these states with overcrowding on decreasing areas of land and a lack of 
resources to support them – then it might be better to do little or nothing 
in the way of mitigation and adaptation efforts.  
UNHCR have argued that climate change ‘could, as the Committee 
notes, trigger international obligations to protect’.41 The frequent refer-
ence to ‘triggers’ that might engage international protection mechanisms 
in the literature around climate refugees, often imply that climate change 
is not enough, that they must set off a further set of circumstances such 
as conflict or persecution in order to engage legal protection. Indeed, as 
 
37 Weiss (n 5). 
38 ibid. 
39 Teitiota v New Zealand (n 1) Annex 1 para 4; Annex 2 para 5.  
40 ibid para 9.6. 
41 UNHCR (n 29). 
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we have seen, the jurisprudence in the Teitiota case reinforces this belief. 
It is possible to see in the HRC’s decision a significant step forward in 
that it identifies the effects of climate change, in and of themselves, as 
creating the conditions in which protection may be granted on the basis 
of the non-refoulement principle. But the emphasis on conflict, of wide-
spread violence suggests that still there must be something more than just 
drought, flooding etc. To the extent that those direct effects of climate 
change are acknowledged by the HRC, still the threshold is maintained 
at arguably a far too acute level to have a concrete application on their 
own. By this we mean that by the time the conditions are such that the 
threshold is met, it is more than likely that the extreme scarcity of potable 
water, of cultivable land, of general precarity, will have created condi-
tions of violence and conflict anyway. In short, the reticence remains in 
allowing the direct effects of climate change per se to be grounds for en-
gaging protection at the international level. As such, tribunals continually 
fall back on the long-established grounds for engaging human rights pro-
tections, rather than trying to develop them in any substantial way to en-
compass the specific and novel threats posed by climate change.  
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
In closing it is important to present Teitiota’s own response to the 
HRC’s decision:  
 
‘Forgive my ignorance, but to be frank, I'm quite disappointed with the 
outcome of my case which has been recently released from the UN… 
It's still the same as before — I'm still worried about my family [because 
of] climate change … the sea level rise, the drinking water is not good 
… [and] I'm still yet to find a job until now. Personally, I think big 
countries like NZ should accept us and not ignore our plight because 
our islands are very low-lying and we are vulnerable even to the slightest 
bad weather or storm surge. I want to ask these big countries to please 
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take our case seriously because we need their help… The notable differ-
ence is that my children are more vulnerable here to the spread of dis-
eases such as a virus infection like a flu or diarrhoea’.42  
 
While commentators all over were trumpeting the HRC decision as a 
‘landmark’, a great ‘step forward’, the reality for Teitiota and many others 
in a similar situation to him and his family, is that they must spend many 
more years living in unsafe and deteriorating conditions. The various it-
erations of this case in New Zealand and at the HRC can be seen as a 
series of promises of protection in the future – maybe the effects of cli-
mate change could give rise to a refugee claim, perhaps at some point in 
the future conditions in Kiribati and elsewhere will get sufficiently worse 
that non-refoulement will be engaged. At some point, maybe, these 
promises will be redeemed, but in the meantime, large and increasing 
numbers of people like the Teitiota family are legally trapped with the 
already dire, and worsening, consequences of climate change.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
42 E Wasuka, ‘Landmark decision from UN Human Rights Committee paves way for 
climate refugees’ ABC News (21 January 2020) available at <www.abc.net.au/news/2020-
01-21/un-human-rights-ruling-worlds-first-climate-refugee-kiribati/11887070>. 
